Executive Summary

by René Hingst

Since the bloody repression of the democracy movement by the military regime about 15 years ago Burma, renamed in Myanmar in 1989 (see Appendix A), is regarded as the Pariah State of Southeast Asia. The regime is frequently in the headlines accused of severe human rights violations. Not only is it charged with oppressing the Democracy Movement and it’s leader, the Noble Peace prize-winner Aung San Suu Kyi, it is also reproached for recruiting minors as soldiers, and more recently, it was confronted with a report “Licence to Rape” (see references) documenting evidence that the Burmese armed forces carried out systematic rapes in Shan State. Burma is also regarded as the world's biggest opium and heroin producer, after Afghanistan and the leading producer of synthetic drugs (amphetamines) in the region.
All the efforts of the international community to convince the ruling military regime to at least share power with the National League for Democracy - legitimised by it’s victory in free elections held in the year 1990 - have proved unsuccessful to this day. The Generals in power could not be persuaded to start a dialogue with the opposition neither through a policy of “constructive engagement” by the neighbouring states nor by measures similar to sanctions (like a ban on new investments) imposed by the USA.
By concentrating on this political conflict, the many social and economic problems of the country, which is counted amongst the poorest in the world, have faded out of sight of the international community. After the events of 1988 most donors suspended their aid which had amounted to about US$ 300 - 400 million annually during the 1980s. The military regime was not able to handle the pressing tasks of development alone. According to observers from the World Bank, the many wrong decisions and policies of the Government only helped to worsen the social and economic problems of the country.
Today international NGOs as well as the UN confirm that the country is at the edge of a humanitarian catastrophe. For example, at the end of the nineteen-nineties 30% to 40% of the population lived below the poverty line. Only about 25% of all children attended an elementary school. Almost 60% of the children were regarded as undernourished and the child mortality rate was at 105 out of 1000. Particular attention was focused on the alarmingly rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. About 2% of the population could already be affected. There-fore there can be no doubt that humanitarian assistance and engagement is absolutely necessary. It is true that any unconditional rise or resumption of assistance risks primarily to serve the interests of the regime and weaken the position of the democratic opposition. However it is only because of the regime’s interest in having all sanction-like measures lifted and development assistance resumed that the Military Junta did not completely eliminate the Burmese Democracy Movement but engaged it in an alibi dialogue.
The current emergency situation in the country means the expansion of humanitarian assistance should be measured by the urgent human needs regardless of the solution of the conflicts. A Code of Conduct should be introduced to serve as a guideline for negotiations and project implementation. It should be a compulsory base for all activities but only as an internal reference. Such a guideline should focus on the objectives without reducing the chances for democracy.
It is an important and urgent task to formulate such guidelines as with each passing day the humanitarian crisis gets worse. Nevertheless it is crucial that the international community does not lose sight of the solution to the political conflict despite the humanitarian crisis. It must be taken into consideration that a peaceful transition to democracy may only be possible by including the Burmese armed forces. A sudden loss of power could lead to a fragmentation of the armed forces and a resumption of inter-ethnic conflicts that could eventually lead to an outbreak of civil war-like conditions.
Currently, at least three variants for a political solution to the conflict for a democratisation of the country can be identified:

A military regime’s proposal for a constitution will be accepted by the democracy movement
At the present time the SPDC has not offered the existing draft as an official proposal. The positive aspect of this variant is that it would establish a connection between the regime and the Democracy Movement and oblige the military to hold elections (if acceptance of elections is real and not only an instrument to gain time and keep the public calm.). At the same time, the military regime would not have to fear loosing control to the democracy movement after the elections because of its constitutionally guaranteed strong position. In the long run, this variant would follow the Indonesian example. The problem with this scenario is that it may - at least in the first phase - constitutionally legitimise authoritarianism in Burma/Myanmar instead of bringing the Democracy Movement to power it could result in it’s legal marginalisation.
The results of the elections of 1990 are accepted as a basis for convening a constitutional assembly
Even if this variant might seem attractive for the democracy activists as a kind of historical “justice”, it is a highly improbable possibility. On the one hand, the regime would rob itself of substantial influence on the structure of the new Constitution, as the NUP which was supported by the armed forces, only won 10 of 485 seats in 1990. On the other hand, it is questionable whether a 12 year old election result can still be seen as a legitimate political basis. This variant is only conceivable if for some reason the end of the regime is in sight and the leading generals need some time for an ordered retreat.
New elections to a constituent meeting
A constituent meeting would have the task to debate and accept a new Constitution. Fol-lowing the example of East Timor, this constituent meeting would later turn into a parliament ex lege with the acceptance of the new Constitution. This variant would save an-other ballot, and seen from a democratic point of view be inoffensive and it would be a meaningful option for the international community, as it would be less expensive
If the British-style “first-past-the-post” electoral system could be changed for these elections for the continental European “proportional representation” electoral system, the armed forces would have a real chance to secure significant influence in a legal way.
Of the three proposed variants this last one would have the “least worst” chances for a realisation. The prerequisites for this variant would be a clear commitment to the resumption of a minimal dialog between the regime and the Democracy Movement in and outside the country; an unambiguous agreement to political amnesty , an agreement about the electoral system (system of proportional representation or first-past-the-post-system) and last but not least the readiness of the international community to collaborate in the process. Since the armed forces control their own mass organisation (the USDA) and since it is improbable that the NLD would be able to unite the majority of the minorities, it is possible that the armed forces could be persuaded to accept this option.

“Code of conduct” for flexible extensive humanitarian assistance with the responsibility of executing development policies with a long term future perspective
It remains to be seen which of the three variants of democratisation in Burma/Myanmar will turn out to be the most probable. At the moment, there is no visible political solution for a democratic transition. Nevertheless action is urgently needed to respond to the humanitarian situation in Burma/Myanmar.
There are or can be three distinct phases for an engagement of the international community in Myanmar/Burma:

“Preparing Engagement” - humanitarian assistance
This first phase refers to the actual situation, in which there is no visible political solution to the conflict, but assistance for the needy population is necessary.
“Democracy-promoting engagement” - humanitarian assistance, additionally the possibility of development cooperation
This second phase would start as soon as a political solution to the conflict begins to show, e.g. the announcement of elections with a fixed schedule
“Democracy-strengthening engagement” - humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, in a regulated framework
The third phase would start with the first steps towards a division of power, e.g. after free general elections and reliable signals that the results of these elections would be accepted by the regime.

The framework of these three phases are flexible in respect of content and time. Flexible humanitarian assistance and the construction of structures for its effective realisation possesses - in spite of the difference in quality - quantitative elements of development cooperation, even if this does not happen within the framework of bilateral agreements.
The lack of interest of the SPDC to start a political dialog is actually a central problem for those organisations disposed to act. Perhaps one can only react within the framework of a “Code of Conduct”. Neither the dogmatic establishment of conditions nor an exaggerated compliance in the negotiations are useful in this context. It is necessary to understand such a “Code of Conduct” as a binding policy guideline for internal reference of the respective organisation and not as conditions that should be negotiated with the government of Burma/Myanmar.
As the former second largest donor, the FRG is already perceived as an established partner in the field of development cooperation with Burma/Myanmar. Without any obvious strategic interests in the region, Germany has a good chance of being able to negotiate - based on such a “Code of Conduct” - the conditions for humanitarian assistance in a wide framework without arousing the suspicion of the regime.
Furthermore, in the current discussion about the “axis of evil” and pariah states it could be a good example of working in a peaceful way to encourage democratisation and development as an alternative to employing political and/or military threats.
The elements of the proposed “Code of Conduct” for a German engagement (see chapter 3.4. for more details) should be the following:

The extension of humanitarian assistance is to be dependent on assessed needs
However its execution is based on the possibility of applying the “Code of Conduct”, independent of the size of the resources.
Democratisation of assistance and transparency of decisions
It should involve all political parties equally. The installation of a “Three-Party-Committee” should be the aim: regime, NLD, representatives of the minorities (based on the so called “Razali-Committee”), which can be consulted for all bigger projects.
If it is impossible to form such a committee (which is probable given the current refusal of dialog by the regime), it could be decided that all three parties should (at least separately) be consulted before the start of bigger projects.
Support to civil society
Projects which either directly address the population concerned (without participation of either state or semi-governmental institutions) or promote the decentralisation of local governments or which support the integration of institutions of the civil society, should be supported by German assistance.
The often easier way of cooperation with exclusively governmental institutions should be avoided so as not to undermine the struggle for democratisation. This potential should not be underestimated, as the structures of civil society have not been destroyed in Burma/Myanmar (as often assumed).
Well-balanced distribution of UN and INGOs
The system of the UN is, due to its bureaucracy, more vulnerable to interventions of the regime. Therefore it is much more inflexible in the creation and utilisation of possible free spaces to assist civil society directly with their programmes or to integrate the above-mentioned challenges of democratisation into their programmes. This is particularly related to resources of larger dimensions, which do not facilitate the small scale and mostly labour intensive projects which can empower local communities and strengthen the potentials of civil society related to them. The motto “Small is beautiful!” is imperative for the planning of projects.
The regime has to take responsibility
Assistance should only be given under the condition that the regime participates in the projects with more than symbolic amounts. This is to prevent the regime from further investing its money in the armed forces and not in the social sector. As well as to ensure that it does not leave the responsibility for solving social problems to the international community and the INGOs which would amount to an indirect support of the regime.
No shifting of resources
Engagement of the international community in Burma/Myanmar shouldn't take place at the expense of their engagement in refugee camps, particularly at the Thai-Burmese border. As long as the repatriation of the refugees to Burma/Myanmar has not been negotiated or the, economically motivated, migration on a massive scale to Thailand has not stopped, reducing or diverting assistance from the refugee camps will politically and humanely give the wrong signal.
Consistent efforts to prevent the misuse of assigned project resources
This means steps must be integrated into the contracts to stop the practice of the manipulation of the exchange rate and the “forced exchange” of currency.
No development at any cost
The guidelines for sustainable development and gender equity must form the basis of every project.
Priority sectors of humanitarian assistance
Health, Food Security, Education and Environment